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Upgrading Europe’s Busiest Bus Corridor – Manchester Oxford Road

By all means, the Oxford Road/Wilmslow Road bus corridor would be considered a sucess. The corridor connects the city centre, from Piccadilly Gardens through the campuses of The University Of Manchester, Manchester Metropolitan University and RNCM. Continuing on, the corridor passes by Manchester Royal Hospital, Curry Mile, Rusholme and the large student neighbourhood of Fallowfield. Further South, there is another Hospital, more dense and large suburbs, then finally the airport.

Large student populations, hospitals an airport and suburbs full of city-centre commuters are prime public transport destinations. Unlike many areas of the city struggling to attract bus ridership, Oxford Road is teaming with it and it shows.

Bus operators jostle for piece of this incredibly lucrative market. Stagecoach, First, Go and Arriva all run services along the corridor. One bus per minute is estimated to leave travelling on the Piccadilly to Withington section of the route, although significantly more join for shorter sections of this, especially around Oxford Road station.

So What’s Wrong?

The Oxford Road Corridor has certainly seen worse days.

Just over a decade ago, the route used to be the wild west, with operators trying to jostle for a peice of the lucrative pie. Unfortunately, competing for the price-sensitive student market and trying to differentiate between the competiton – while essentially providing an identical service – lead to a race to the bottom. In terms of not just service – but also safety.

A parliment select committee in 2006 discussed the issue, with a few eyebrow raising comments:

The Wilmslow Road corridor, although enjoying a level of service that no other route in England has in terms of the frequency of buses, is chaos. This is because many companies are running the same route and competing for passengers. Various estimations of patronage have been suggested from research, one as low as 3.5 passengers per bus on average. In actual fact the exact figures are not available to us because of commercial sensitivity. Stagecoach prices along this route are high and smaller companies buy up cheaper, older and dirtier buses and carry passengers for as little as a third of the Stagecoach price. Some of them still carry London posters because they are rejected stock from London, where standards are higher.

At the point where the Metrolink track shares road space with buses, trams have been known to have to wait behind a queue of up to ten buses, whilst the buses wait to get into Piccadilly bus station, which is overcrowded to the point of congestion, therefore adding to the levels of congestion throughout the city centre and presenting danger to the pedestrians who share this space with the buses.

Similarly, the effect of exhaust fumes from buses, particularly the older buses on the Wilmslow Road corridor, goes unchecked and this is a major public health and environmental impact. In fact, Manchester gets London’s older buses since emission standards in London are higher.

Now, 15 years later, while the situation on Oxford Road has improved somewhat, issues still remain. The route suffers from congestion, long journey times and a chaotic mix of operators.

Ultimately the report ends up concluding:

A franchise system, whereby companies cannot just cherry pick the more profitable routes would help protect communities such as Moss Side from the sudden loss of their services.

After 15 years, TFGM (Transport For Greater Manchester) is finally close to creating a franchising system for buses, similar to what is seen in London. This means among other things, they can set fares, routes and timetables, giving them a significant amount of flexibility to reform the bus network.

It is worth noting that some work has already begun on improving service on the route, including making the section of Oxford Road between the station and Rusholme bus, taxi and acess only, doing a good job of relieving congestion. Proper segregated bike lanes offer arguably the best cycling experience in Manchester and have noticably bolstered active transportation in the area.

Solutions – Change Modes? Metrolink?

Considering the significant numbers of passengers, it could be argued that the corridor may be best moving away from buses. Rail can move a significantly higher amount of passengers, typically at higher speeds than buses can.

It would make sense, therefore, to consider extending the Metrolink system down the corridor. Each tram can be up to four cars long, can run at very short frequencies and offers fast level boarding, with two doors per carriage. Payment is done offboard, making dwell times pretty short.

Unfortunately, this seems to be off the table for the time being. TFGM’s 2040 report does not suggest any possibility of deploying trams to serve the corridor.

Improving bus service – BRT style

Still, there is a lot that could be improved about the bus service, especially if/when TFGM gains franchising powers.

Simplifying routes:
With less operators, there is less need for competing routes, essentially covering the same journey. This means passengers can simlply turn up to the first bus running down the corridor, without having to worry about which operator’s ticket they have. The number of buses being run can better match the demand from passengers, reducing congestion at quieter times of day, and running a more consistent nightime service.

More doors:
Currently, buses rely on passengers boarding/alighting through one door, creating a significant bottleneck and greatly increasing dwell times. As many of the buses are also double decker, the problem is increased, as it takes a while for the passengers alighting to do so, as they need extra time to climb down the stairs.

Volvo B5LHC Double Deck Electric Hybrid

Whilst many BRT or rapid bus systems tend to use single deck, three-door articulated units, these may prove themselves less flexible for the tighter, more congested streets in the UK. London trialled them a few years ago as a replacement for Routemasters, but they proved to be unpopular with drivers, who struggled to navigate them through the city’s narrow streets. Manchester is likely quite similar in this regard, however, the double decker design can be improved to reduce dwell times. London double-deckers provide both a door for boarding and alighting, so both can take place simultaneously.

Fare-reform, smart cards and off-board payment:
Currently, a significant limiting factor to bus capacity is the amount of time it takes to process fares and payments for every passenger. When loading at Piccadilly Gardens, it frequently takes a good five, possibly ten, minutes for each and every passenger to navigate the confusing fare system to find their ticket, or relay the exact stop they wish to travel to. Passengers must then hand over cash, or scan their credit card (contactless payment is an improvement, at least) before they can receive their ticket.

This clearly slows down dwell times considerably, reducing capacity and slowing down the journeys of people on the bus. Ideally, buses should be integrated into the existing Metrolink zone system, charging people a fair distanced-based amount for their ticket and allowing free transfers to other modes for their journey. (meaning less requirement to run as many complex point to point routes.)

Off board payment would involve using ticket machines provided at enhanced stops (see below), where passengers can top up and dispense smart cards, or purchase paper tickets (useful if just visiting the city).

Reform Stops:
I think there is an opportunity to experiment with some more BRT-style elements on Oxford Road. I think currently the stops are perhaps too closely spaced together. The sheer frequency of buses makes it difficult for passengers to flag down the right one.

What may work best is to place stops further apart, but have buses stopping at every one. With streamlined fare payment and dedicated rights of way all down the route, the overall journeys should be faster. These stops could be slightly more “grand” affairs than a pole in the ground, with raised platforms to allow for fast level boarding at all doors (no need for the driver to lower a ramp or suspension), benches, shelters and ticket machines. The larger stops would help to improve the experience, speed up dwell times and create a more cohesive experience.

Dedicated right of way:
This is what ultimately makes or breaks a transport service. Regardless of mode, without a dedicated right of way, you are stuck getting caught in traffic and having external factors disrupt service.

Now, Oxford Road has got off to a good start. Much of the route is already dedicated to buses-only, or reasonably high quality bus lanes are supplied. However, things do start to slow down a bit near Whitworth Park and especially through Curry Mile. Curry Mile will be a complicated area to find a good solution that balances the needs of everyone involved. The area is very congested, but a lot of this is from local shops and businesses, many of which rely on being able to load from the front. Still, I think that actually moving through car traffic off Wilmslow Road will be beneficial. The existing street-parking bays can be used for loading for the buisinesses, disabled parking, or removed to create space for better bus stops and larger pavements. The area is very busy with pedestrians and I think with re-design of the streets to better accomodate them, this could really benefit local businesses. Especially if the resturants have space to expand their outdoor dining options.

Further down Wilmslow Road, past Platt Field’s, may be best to also restrict through-traffic. A lot of car journeys are better served by the A34, so dividing streets into local “blocks” with acess only would be the best solution to help keep the roads uncongested. It is worth noting this would also be very beneficial for emergency services going to Manchester Royal Hospital, who would be able to use the infrastructure to get around traffic much faster.

Making it green

Of course, running off overhead electric power is one of the benefits of the tram. It makes them quieter and reduces pollution, compared to diesel buses. That said, buses on Oxford Road have been improving. Hybrid buses are very common and new electric buses can be seen wizzing up and down serving the 43.

Battery electric buses would be a decent solution for powering the corridor, especially with a standardised fleet capable of being charged at charging facilities either end of the route.

However, I think Trolleybuses could be an even better solution for the route. I know they are seen as somewhat archaic, etc,etc, but they offer some significant benefits. Besides, the route is certainly busy enough to warrant the investment in infrastructure.

  • No need to charge, or worry about range.
  • Once you have erected infrastructure, the vehicles will be cheaper to buy and maintain. (due to reduced battery requirements*.)
  • Less weight from batteries reduces wear on road surface. (Remember, wear on roads increases with a square of the weight.)
  • Increased efficiency as the bus doesn’t have to carry weight of batteries, fuel or ICE. (Batteries also lose some energy when being charged/discharged and are typically less efficient in colder temperatures.)
  • Modern trollies usually carry a small amount of traction batteries, so have some flexibility in routing and resillience if a section of wire fails.

*Yes, there will still likely be some batteries onboard for flexibility and backup as explained above. However, you need considerably less than an entirely battery-powered EV. Batteries will be fully charged all time under wires, so will have 100% of the range when off them. Where a battery-powered bus usually needs 1-200 miles of range, a trolleybus would likely only need 10-20 miles. This would cost much less and weigh much less.

In Conclusion

Of course, these are only proposals, but I think that while there is a lot that is good about Oxford Road as a transport corridor, there is a lot that could be improved.

Taking on some of these ideas could really reform the way we think about buses and public transport in the UK and create a system that would be fantastic to use and a symbol of Manchester’s ability to innovate and push the boundaries, as we have done with Metrolink and as we did with some of the first intercity railways.

If I have a comments section set up, feel free to add your thoughts, or @ me on wherever and shout at me there.

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Our Urban World

Hi!

I don’t actually do much in relation to urban design, traffic engineering, etc…however, I have a massive interest in cities and the people/economics that built them.

Currently 55% of the world’s population live in cities, with this figure expected to grow to 68% by 2050.

This rapid growth brings both potential prosperity, but also challenges to the world’s cities and soon to be cities. Population growth can make cities flourish, but if not managed correctly real-estate prices can skyrocket, infrastructure can crumble and the residents can be stuck in an endless sea of traffic, pollution and crime.

I’ll try and get as close to the truth as possible and research into solutions for problems the cities of today and tomorrow will face!

Why HS2 Is Actually Free

…The Economics Of Funding Infrastructure Improvements

ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY BILLION POUNDS?!!!

ALL AT THE TAXPAYER’S EXPENSE?

This is the narrative you get mostly in the news in regards to High Speed Two, the UK’s “controversial” high speed rail project. Costs are exhorbitant (I will look at this in a future post) and will be footed entirely by the poor, downtrodden UK taxpayer. All of this at the expense of other underfunded public services, like the NHS, Schools and Local Councils. However, this isn’t necessarily true, and this narrative feeds into a larger story of a country unwilling to invest in itself, the future, and a path to sustainability and prosperity.

CAPEX VS OPEX

There are two types of costs that occur in life that can be seen in businesses, individuals and governments. These are typically referred to as CAPEX (Capital Expenditure) and OPEX (Operational Expenditure). It is important to differentiate between these types of expenses, as they are typically paid for in very different ways.

Operational Expenditures are ongoing expenses that occur when running a system. An example of an operational expenditure would be paying for things like staff, supplies, and energy.

Capital Expenditures, however, tend to be “one-time” costs, used to develop, build or improve an asset. An example of capital expenditures are things like buildings, roads, or in this case: railways.

It is important to differentiate, because the nature of these expenses makes the financing and payment models quite different. Let’s say for example you take out a mortgage for your house. If you are renting your house, you are not able to take out a mortgage to pay for that, as it is an operational expense, a.k.a an ongoing cost you need to contiunue to pay for acess to the property. Borrowing money to pay rent is typically a bad idea, as the money borrowed will not continue to provide benefit at the point it needs to be paid back. However, if you borrow money to purchase a home, the house continues to provide benefit for the duration of the time you are making re-payments on the loan.

Believe it or not, the same thing applies for large infrastructure projects. The government takes out loans to pay for projects like HS2, which will then be paid back over a certain number of years, during which the project will continue to provide benefit.

This is the reason why the money being used to fund HS2 cannot be diverted to the NHS. The NHS is primarily an operational expense, meaning that it is generally funded by continual tax revenue, rather than loans. This is not to say the NHS would not benefit from capital expenditure (e.g new hospitals, equipment), but HS2 essentially has no impact on the ability of the government to invest in capital projects for the NHS.

Repayments

The repayments are essentially borrowed off future economic growth, which HS2 helps to secure. As HS2 will bring in multiple pounds for every one spent, it will help to expand (or at least limit the decline) of the economy, therefore the amount of tax the government will recieve.

So sure, HS2 will cost “£1600” per taxpayer, but as it will return £2 for every £1 invested, it will boost the economy by £3200 per taxpayer. So in a way, it doesn’t really “cost” anything. Many reports omit the wider social (and economic) benefits of the scheme, increasing the value proposition further.

COVID actually increases the business case for building HS2.

Coming back to capital vs operational expenses, let’s have a look at another argument typically thrown at the project. “We can’t afford it because of COVID”.

It is likely that after the pandemic, the government will have to continue borrowing money and keep taxes low, in order to re-boost the economy off the back of a year of significant restrictions on economic and social freedoms. The only other option is to return to post-2008 era austerity, which saw very slow and uneven economic growth, something that will continue to compound existing inequalities and poverty in the country.

Currently, schemes like furlough, eat out to help out, VAT cuts, etc, are operational expenses. They offer a short term injection of cash that will be borrowed and need to be paid back at a later date, despite them not really continuing to provide value when the repayments come round. This is not to say there are not good reasons behind them, many of these schemes have saved millions from hardship during this time, but they are certainly a long term headache.

However, investment in infrastructure is a capital expense. Not only do they provide a short term injection of cash during construction, the projects continue to provide value when the repayments come around. Projects like HS2 are a great way to secure growth, while also not leaving onerous repayments for schemes who’s value has long expired.

Indeed, looking towards other big issues, such as climate change, we should massively expand the scope of construction and capital investment in the UK, to invest in carbon-free energy, sustainable transport and housing and infrastructure that is more resillient to the impacts of changing weather patterns.

Interest Rates & Bonds

It is also worth noting interest rates on lending have dropped to record lows, as stock markets and businesses have become increasingly unstable. Investors are now looking towards lending money to governments, who are very low risk borrowers. Depending on if these bonds are indexed (linked to inflation) or not, bonds agreed upon now, with very low interest rates, may actually result in the government being paid to borrow the money.

Conclusion

When looking at a project/scheme and the expenses involved in its creation, it is worth considering wether it is a capital, or operational expense, as these tend to significantly impact the economic viability of it.

Indeed, schemes could be very cheap capital-expenditure wise, but result in high operational expenses. A new railway could be built very cheaply if it used freight wagons on jointed track, being hauled along with a big rope by a tug of war team. But obviously, pound for pound, this scheme will prove itself considerably more expensive.

The UK’s inability to pull out its wallet and invest in its future is holding it back considerably. In order to keep up with the world’s latest superpowers, we need to invest in high speed rail, sustainable energy and cutting edge construction/engineering capabilities. Not only will these schemes provide a short term economic boost, as long as we are sensible, they will continue to provide benefits larger than their costs when it comes time to pay the money back.

jhrambles

For all 0 people who follow my blog, I thought I’d update you on my name change!

Whilst I still want to talk a lot about transportation and urban design, I think I want to change the blog to something where I can talk more about politics in general and other topics like technology, climate change, space and media!

Why the Conservatives Will Ultimately Be Responsible for Killing UK Rail Privatisation.

There has been a lot of talk in news and politics about Rail Privatisation. One of Labour’s key manifesto statements has been the “re-nationalisation” of UK railways, a move that (in theory) is supposed to improve reliability and result in cheaper fares.

However, it may not end up being Labour that kills rail privatisation, but the Conservatives. This is not some change of heart though, but a tale of mismanagement and incompetence, which has lead to the present situation.

Some historical context.

I’ll try and keep this short, as the very subject could take about three blog posts in itself!
Essentially, in 1993 the Conservative government under John Major made the decision to privatise the railways. At the time, ridership was continuing to fall and privatisation seemed like a good way to hopefully improve service and bring passengers back, or manage the decline and reduce costs to the taxpayer. However, it wouldn’t just be sold off to one private company and be done. Instead, the DfT (Department For Transport) would award franchises to TOCs (Train Operating Companies), through a competitive bidding system, once every 5-7 years.

These TOCs would run the services and operate stations/ticket machines, leasing trains from ROSCOs (Rolling stock leasing companies). Between 1994 and 2002, the actual rail infrastructure (track, signalling, etc) was owned and run by a group of companies called Railtrack.

The important thing to take from this, is that although the TOCs would be in charge of operations (Staff, maintenance, timetabling), the infrastructure and service requirements (a.k.a frequency and routes) would be determined by 3rd parties in the form of Railtrack and the Department for Transport.

The First Casualty

In 1997, a series of mistakes caused an Intercity 125 to crash into a freight train at 80mph in Southall, just outside London. The carriages smashed into each other, being derailed and crushed like tin cans, resulting in the deaths of 7 and injuring 149 more. It was found the TOC, Great Western Mainline, had failed to inform Railtrack that the automatic warning system was out of service in the cab of the express train. Later the signaller set a conflicting path, assuming the driver of the Intercity 125 would have this additional audible warning. Compounding this was the fact the driver was packing his bag instead of looking at the signals, he would later be charged with manslaughter.

In October ’99, two passenger trains crashed into each other at high speed, another Intercity 125 and a Class 165 commuter train, collided at a combined speed of 120mph just a few miles away from the site of the ’97 crash. The resulting crushing of an entire coach of the 165, derailments, jackknifing of the HST, and fireball from spilt diesel would claim 31 lives and cause 417 injuries.

Whilst Railtrack was at least somewhat responsible for both these accidents, blame mostly lay on the incumbent TOCs. However, with questions and probes into their stewardship of the network, things couldn’t get much worse, until they did.

In October 2000, an Intercity 225 was travelling at 115mph when it suddenly derailed outside of Hatfield, Herefordshire. Due to poor track maintenance, a rail on the left hand side of the train fractured, derailing all but two cars and overturning the restaurant car, killing four and seriously injuring 70. The blame for this laid squarely at the door of poor management and training at Railtrack, causing the company to go into administration.

Network Rail – the First Horseman of Nationalisation.

The first aspect of nationalisation could be argued to have happened in 2002, with the birth of Network Rail. Network Rail was made to replace Railtrack as and is owned by the Department For Transport (a.k.a the government), reinvesting income into rail improvements. Under Network Rail and increased subsidies, the safety and reliability of the network’s infrastructure improved and it continues to operate to this day.

Increased passenger numbers

From their lowest point in the late 80’s/early 90’s, passenger numbers on UK railways have grown significantly, now outstripping even the peak of rail travel back in the early 1900’s. The reasons behind this are hotly debated, from improvements in service due to privatisation, to changing working/commuting patterns.

Either way, passenger numbers have increased to record levels. Unfortunately, the government has been slow to respond. In 2004, Serco-Abellio Northern was awarded a “no-growth” franchise by the New Labour government. This would mean it would be unable to acquire new rolling stock, outside of some limited transfers of 2nd hand rolling stock from areas such as the South East. Whilst the rolling stock was old and change limited, the franchise did a good job at improving reliability and saw a significant increase in passengers. This pattern would be repeated across the country. The prevalence of “no-growth” regional franchises would cause headaches going into the future.

TOCs Forced Into Union-Busting

In 2010, a government report suggested that an increase in DOO (Driver Only Operation), could reduce costs on the network significantly. To this day, most trains in the UK require a guard to open and close the doors, with around 30% of services (mostly commuter service around London) using the driver to open the doors instead.

However, the unions RMT and ASLEF, representing rail workers rejected this on the grounds of safety and efficiency, despite a significant amount of services, often on busy routes, operating this way already. The argument is fierce within the rail industry, with many rightly concerned about the need to assist disabled passengers and maintain passenger safety, whilst others understandably argue DOO will make the railways more competitive and allow guards (should they remain on the train), to do their jobs in assisting passengers and selling tickets, more efficiently.

The debate was pretty unresolvable. The unions wanted to maintain control and keep their staff in jobs, while the government saw an opportunity to reduce the staff required on each train, allowing them to reduce costs and expand service. However, instead of trying to resolve this in a sensible manner, the decision was made in 2014 to set requirements to expand DOO on the new Northern franchise, with a target for 50% of route miles to be covered by trains with driver control only by 2020. The government also gave the green light for franchises like Southern to introduce DOO.

So the Conservative past time of union busting was set to continue, however this time they could blame the TOCs when it all went wrong….

Southern all drivers walked out over two days in December 2016, leading every service to be cancelled.

Meanwhile, up north, RMT staff took part in 47 days of strike action, mostly over consecutive Saturdays, decimating weekend services for over six months.

Trouble Up North

I have mentioned Northern Rail already in this article, as this franchise takes centre stage in the tale of mismanagement and passenger woe. Whilst there have been issues across the whole network, Northern is an almost perfect case study of everything wrong with the UK rail industry today.

Whilst Northern were certainly not blameless for their part in the debacle, simply re-nationalising will have a negligible impact on service quality. With the Coronavirus situation, it is hard to currently tell what has truly changed with the franchise. Time will tell if the new management does any better when full service resumes.

In 2014, the Department For Transport put a tender out to potential TOCs for a new franchise. Generally, it is left until the time franchises are renewed to invest in new Rolling Stock (Trains) and the local stations the TOC is responsible for operating. Presumably, this is so the potential operators can bid against each other for the best plan to improve service in line with the DfT’s goals.

As part of the tender, the DfT promised a raft of infrastructure improvements, including:

  • North West Electrification, including Manchester to Liverpool Via Chat Moss, Manchester to Blackpool North and Liverpool to wigan by 2016.
  • An extra rail link in Manchester between Piccadilly and Victoria by 2016, alongside increased through platform capacity at Piccadilly and Oxford Road as part of the Northern Hub Project by 2018.
  • Transpennine Electrification from Manchester to York Via Leeds and Huddersfield by 2018.
  • There were also unconfirmed promises of much more electrification, from up in Windermere, to down in Chester and other infrastructure improvements such as the Hope Valley Capacity Upgrade.

However, by the time Arriva Rail North (Northern) began the franchise in April 2016, there were still no shovels in the ground on many of the promised projects. In July 2017, Transport Secretary Chris Grayling began to cast doubts as to whether many of the projects would even still happen. Due to years of limited to no experience with capital construction among Network Rail and their contractors, those projects which weren’t axed, faced significant delays.

What Grayling and the DfT failed to realise though, is that cogs had already been set into motion to facilitate these projects falling into place. Arriva’s Northern franchise was expecting to be running electric trains on many routes, allowing them to move more diesel trains onto other routes suffering from overcrowding. Timetables were being drawn up too, accounting for higher acceleration and top speeds, allowing trains to be run closer together. Drivers were predominately being trained on “new” (recasts from the south) electric trains, which had a different training regime to the diesel stock they would replace.

Things were quickly beginning to cook up and with limited co-ordination between the DfT, Network Rail, Northern, Transpennine Express and other TOCs, disaster would strike soon…

May 2018

Twice a year, timetables across the UK rail network are recast. This helps the TOCs and Network Rail to adjust service patterns to reduce congestion, take advantage of new infrastructure and add or remove service where appropriate. These happen on May and December, usually with some minor adjustments that go unnoticed, apart from the odd “huh” as you check the timetable, before setting off on your commute that morning.

However, May 2018’s timetable change would be far from unnoticed. In fact, it would almost cost Grayling his position as transport secretary. (A terrible prospect, if any politician actually cared about a position other than PM…)

On the first day of the timetable, May 20th, 146 services suffered from cancellations, with many others seeing reduced capacity, as Northern struggled to move both its rolling stock and staff to the correct locations. Down south, delayed electrification on the Midland Mainline resulted in significant issues on Thameslink, with services seeing an even more dramatic drop in reliability.

Ultimately, the TOCs and Network Rail were to blame for not being more open about the issues they were facing coming up to the timetable change. But with large decisions, like delaying a timetable rollout laying firmly at the door of the DfT, a significant proportion of the blame also lies there. Especially as many issues were to do with cancelled or delayed infrastructure projects, due to construction mismanagement of the DfT.

Running Out Of Money

Many members of the public assume that rail franchises rake in tons of profits, money that could otherwise go on reduced fares or infrastructure improvements. However, what many don’t realise, is a lot of local franchises run at a loss, with only those franchises running more profitable intercity and commuter routes, being cash flow positive. Local franchises such as Northern, rely on subsidies from the government.

Arriva was likely glad to clean its hands of Northern Rail. They reported a loss of 226 million in the year 2018/19, dwarfing the modest £10-20m profits they had made in the years prior. Even on supposedly profitable franchises, high expectations of returns by the DfT make them financially un-feasible to run. Virgin Trains East Coast came to an agreement with the DfT to terminate their contract in 2018, just three years after it commenced.

Trouble Sourcing Bidders

When it came time to replace the franchise for East Midlands Trains, it was evident the pool of bidders was beginning to thin out. The franchise bidding began in March 2017, with Arriva, Firstgroup/Trenetalia and Stagecoach. After it was decided new TOCs would be required to shoulder the cost of the built up pension deficit in the rail sector, both Stagecoach and Arriva were disqualified for their refusal to do so. Firstgroup/Trenetalia would drop out to focus on bidding for another franchise. Only a later addition, Abellio would deliver a “compliant” bid, so was awarded the franchise by default.

Now, with the Coronavirus pandemic causing all sectors of the economy to take a hit, I highly doubt that any business will want to enter the especially difficult market of public transportation. This combined with expectations of large pensions debt, an almost certainty of failure to deliver promised infrastructure and overambitious profit returns/subsidy reductions, will be enough to put of many bidders.

How Can This Be Resolved?

Whilst my frustration is obviously aimed at those in power, I will take aims at both sides of the fence in my conclusion. The Conservatives have completely mismanaged rail, especially in the post-Brexit era, where the conversation has only been shifted from Brexit, by the Coronapocalypse. However, Labour has failed to hold them properly accountable, or do anything except bang the drum of nationalisation.

To summarise, what have the Conservatives done wrong with rail?

Poor Management of Capital Construction – Projects are often awarded in sudden bursts, for the majority of them to be unceremoniously cancelled a couple of years later. This process has been likened to “boom and bust” by the industry. This causes issues, as significant amounts of trained staff members, specialist equipment and knowledge has to be built up at the start of every scheme, to be quickly lost as soon as the contract is finished.

RIA members are clear that ‘boom and bust’ creates uncertainty within the supply chain and acts as a disincentive to invest in new technology, processes and people, increasing costs by up to 30%. This is bad news for rail suppliers, as well as the government, the travelling public and the taxpayer.

There is still much more to do: avoiding the boom and bust in CP6 – Rail Technology Magazine

Experts estimate construction costs could be reduced by up to 30%, avoiding this cycle. Instead of cancelling projects when costs and timescales begin to rise, the government should be willing to take the hit to begin with, while new experience is built up in the sector. Modest funding over an extended period for infrastructure improvements would provide the best value to taxpayers and passengers. For example, instead of promising to electrify the whole Midland Mainline, Transpennine Routes and a few Local lines in a couple of years, instead promise to electrify 50-100 km of track a year for a given budget. Keep the budget stable over a number of years, while encouraging Network Rail and associated contractors to increase the distance electrified each year.

Be Willing To Invest – An F1 car is no good on a dirt track. A cruise ship is no good in a duck pond. A 3D animator is no good on your Grandma’s virus-ridden XP laptop. Each rail passenger is someone commuting to an otherwise inaccessible city centre job. Each rail passenger is one less person going by car on our ever more congested and polluted roads. Each rail passenger is someone heading to see friends/family, going to their favourite restaurant or spend a weekend at the beach.

Big British Cities outside of London are less productive than their international counterparts. This is absolutely no surprise, considering that many struggle to get to their jobs on time, and going for that shopping trip becomes a 3 hour saga of cancellations and delay. And until the day the private sector provides us all with affordable jetpacks to smash into buildings with, the government seems to be the only body capable of delivering proper improvements to the transportation sector.

Forcing Risk onto Franchisees – Revenue risk and other liabilities are increasingly being put onto the TOCs in question. Whilst this seems like a good incentive for a TOC to run a reliable service, the government is increasingly using it as an insurance policy against taking risk itself. This means TOCs will increasingly require higher subsidies or reduced re-payments to act as an insurance premium. However, as an entity with the power to literally print money, this doesn’t make much sense. I don’t think the military has contents insurance for their aircraft carriers?

When You Cancel Something, Replace It With a Viable Solution – Whilst Chris Grayling was happy to chop through plenty of in the works plans, he failed to replace any with viable alternatives. Many of these projects were mid course, with components already completed. Take for example, Manchester’s Castlefield Corridor. The Ordsall Chord connects up Victoria to Oxford Road and Piccadilly stations. As part of the Northern Hub, the Ordsall Chord opened up opportunities for more trains to run from Leeds to the airport, or passengers from the North of the city to connect to trains running southwards. However, the areas it leads into already had limited platform capacity, which was to be resolved by remodelling Oxford Road and adding two new platforms at Piccadilly. When the upgrades to Piccadilly and Oxford Road were cancelled, the extra services now passing through all three stations, served to just clog the area up to unusable levels. This lead Oxford Road, a station entirely served by the corridor, to become the most unreliable in the UK, with 73% of services delayed or cancelled.

What Can Labour & Opposition Do to Better Hold the Conservatives to Account?

Labour needs to put pressure on the Conservatives on what they will do to resolve specific local issues and bottlenecks. For example, bringing up the continued existence of Pacers. Whilst functionally okay, the passenger experience was poor and the train sets were becoming unreliable. Continued pressure from campaign groups and politicians led to the DfT’s eventual decision to replace the units through cascading, meaning that the North and Midlands now has over 100 brand new units connecting its regional centres.

I think the general public will be receptive to this narrative. Campaigning for say the replacement of a specific set of clapped out trains, or remodelling of problematic choke points on the network are concrete issues that can be perceived by everyone. It is hard to argue against these projects when their goals are clear, defined and have a noticeably positive impact on service.

Closing Remarks

“Nationalisation” as a narrative is not concrete leaves itself open for debate. I think it is much more compelling narrative for those in local communities to bring up the neglect of their local transport infrastructure and how projects to fix the issues have been canned to their detriment.

And as we are soon to see, with the years of mismanagement and tough market conditions beginning to spell the end for rail franchising, nationalisation as a concept will make little to no difference, if we continue to be unwilling to make investments into the infrastructure itself.

The solution to traffic, add more lanes! Right?

The incessant debate around traffic can drive people almost as mad as the jams themselves. I think everyone would agree the world over that traffic is possibly the worst part of urban living. The solution is simple though…Build more car lanes! Right?

Well, maybe not. A concept known as ‘induced demand’ states that the more road capacity that is available, the more people are encouraged to drive, failing to improve congestion. This concept is championed by some and all but dismissed by others, both positions which are understandable. It’s difficult to tell the difference between what demand has previously been suppressed by traffic and what has been induced as a result of increased road capacity.

All of this extra traffic can have positive effects, people driving more means another trip to their favourite coffee shop, picking up some more shifts at work or doing other things that positively impact the local economy. However, pollution, increased congestion in other areas and the safety issues associated with increased traffic are big problems. All of this extra tarmac is also a big contributor to the heat island effect and more surface runoff!

Land use policies and their effects.

I definitely believe that land use policies have a massive effect on whether or not the traffic on a newly expanded highway will grow until it becomes as congested as before.

All of this new capacity means people can afford to travel longer distances for work or for leisure. If new road capacity is matched with suburban expansion further out the city, you can bet the road will become filled with new traffic in no time! Plus, other car-oriented policies such as parking minimums force urban areas to spread out over more land, increasing the distances between places people want to visit, further increasing reliance on cars.

North America fell victim to this more than almost any other region of the world. Cities a fraction the size of their European or Asian counterparts have larger highways and significantly more congestion. Other countries have motorways/expressways /freeways/autobahns though don’t they? How come they don’t have the same issues?

A Happy Medium?

I think the best solutions to cities/urban areas looking to solve their traffic issues has to involve looking at the bigger picture. If you still want to resolve traffic, perhaps consider the following options to ensure the roads won’t just fill right up again with that pesky induced demand!

  1. Is the way you use land forcing people to drive more? Perhaps look at ridding yourselves of those parking minimums and free parking on every street corner! Also beware of suburban development sneakily expanding those urban lines, meaning your residents will be driving much further to their jobs and leisure activities than before.
  2. Could other transportation options serve that demand better? Buses, trams and trains can fit more people and provide significantly higher capacity in much less space due to the fact that many more people are in the same vehicle! Public transport is crucial for transporting people round dense, urban areas as well as giving the car-less options for getting around. Plus, they happen to be a lot safer and more environmentally friendly! North American cities tend to plough large roads through dense urban cores, whereas the rest of the world tends to keep them further out of the cities, where they can better serve as a transportation solution between less dense areas.
  3. How can I grow my city in a way that doesn’t choke it with traffic? Perhaps build more residential areas near the Central Business District of the city, meaning people won’t have to travel so far to their work or leisure activities. If the distance is short enough, your residents might even walk it! Make sure that your residents have access to good public transportation, which is a greener and more space-efficient way of moving people around. Also, don’t just listen to the drivers! They may be some of the most vocal when it comes to the issues they face, but perhaps see how other street users get around. Making life easier for walkers, cyclists and transit users may encourage more to use these space-efficient ways of getting around.

So that’s my first blog. I’m no expert on the field and this was simply a quick overview on the subject, but I hope you learnt something!

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